

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 06217 01 OF 04 201812Z

45

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

DRC-01 ACDA-19 /164 W

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R 201620Z DEC 73

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3353

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 6217

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TEXT OF IS DRAFT ON VERIFICATION

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: USNATO 6177

1. INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAS CIRCULATED REVISED DRAFT (FULL TEXT BELOW) OF SPC REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SUGGESTIONS MADE IN THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 17 (REFTEL). ON STABILIZING MEASURES, SPC DRAFTING GROUP PRODUCED FIRST DRAFT OF AN SPC REPORT, BASED UPON U.S. ANNEX OF NOVEMBER 12. IS WILL CIRCULATE TEXT OF STABILIZATION MEASURES PAPER ON DECEMBER 21, WHICH WE WILL TRANSMIT TOGETHER WITH MISSION COMMENTS. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE ON VERIFICATION MEASURES PAPER IN TIME FOR SPC DISCUSSION JANUARY 14.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF IS REVISED DRAFT ON VERIFICATION:

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06217 01 OF 04 201812Z

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION ON VERIFICATION IN MBFR IS CONTAINED IN C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPH 15, WHICH READS AS

FOLLOWS: "ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INSPECTION, SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS DESIRABLE TO SEEK MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS."

2. IN ADDITION, PARAGRAPH 32 STATES: "THE ALLIES WILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP. ALL VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES."

3. PARAGRAPH 33 STIPULATES THAT "NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISIONS OF MBFR AGREEMENTS", AND THAT "IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES" (I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) APPLICABLE TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. IT STATES THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IS REQUIRED.

4. WITHIN THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, WITH MILITARY/TECHNICAL INPUT FROM THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN CONSIDERING OVERT VERIFICATION POSSIBILITIES AND DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THIS REPORT CONTAINS THE COMMITTEE'S FINDING. IT RECOMMENDS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ACCEPTABLE AND FEASIBLE NEGOTIATED INSPECTION POSSIBILITIES, RECOGNIZING OF COURSE THAT THE FINAL CHOICE OF MEASURES AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EACH IN ANY OVERALL
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06217 01 OF 04 201812Z

INSPECTION SCHEME CAN BE DECIDED ONLY AS THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION DEVELOPS.

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

5. THE ALLIES RECOGNIZE THAT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF DATA ARRIVED AT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS NEEDS TO BE SOLVED.

ADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION

6. THE ALLIES WILL SEEK OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES
(I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) SINCE THEY COULD
HAVE THE ADVANTAGES OF:

(A) ENABLING THOSE ALLIED COUNTRIES WITH LITTLE OR NO
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS TO PARTICIPATE
ACTIVELY IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS;

(B) PROVIDING MORE DIRECT MBFR MONITORING FOR ALL ALLIED
COUNTRIES INVOLVED;

(C) MEETING ALLIED DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REQUIREMENTS. OVERT MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION WOULD
BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PURELY NATIONAL MEANS IN
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENTS AND IN PUBLIC
THAT THE MBFR AGREEMENTS WERE BEING OBSERVED AND
THAT VIOLATORS WOULD BE DETECTED;

(D) BEING MORE EFFECTIVE THAN NATIONAL MEANS IN PROVIDING
A BASIS FOR CONFRONTING A VIOLATOR WITH EVIDENCE OF
HIS VIOLATION. SINCE THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE GATHERED
BY SEVERAL NATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, IT
WOULD BE MORE CREDIBLE THAN IF GENERATED EXCLUSIVELY
BY NATIONAL MEANS. IT WOULD ALSO BE MORE LIKELY TO
BE RELEASABLE THAN NATIONAL EVIDENCE, SINCE THE LATTER
IS OFTEN DETECTED OR PRIMARILY EVALUATED THROUGH HIGHLY
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06217 01 OF 04 201812Z

CLASSIFIED MEANS;

(E) FILLING GAPS AND RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES IN EXISTING
INFORMATION AND SHORTENING THE TIME REQUIRED TO MAKE
VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS;

(F) DETERRING VIOLATIONS BY INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY
OF THEIR DETECTION;

(G) INCREASING WARNING TIME, POSSIBLY THE MOST IMPORTANT
CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S SECURITY WHICH COULD RESULT
FROM OVERT VERIFICATION. THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL
WARNING TIME CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED PRECISELY. ANY
ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME WOULD BE OF VALUE IN MANAGING
A CRISIS SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

(H) INDICATING WILLINGNESS OF THE TWO SIDES TO BE MORE
OPEN ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THEREBY ENHANCING
EAST-WEST CONFIDENCE.

RECIPROCITY

7. ANY NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES AGREED UPON WOULD

HAVE TO BE APPLIED RECIPROCALLY. IN GENERAL IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT ON THEIR TERRITORY ARRANGEMENTS SO INTRUSIVE THAT RECIPROCAL APPLICATION WOULD HARM WESTERN INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, EACH POSSIBLE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANY AGREED REDUCTION MEASURES, MUST BE CAREFULLY E

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06217 02 OF 04 201912Z

51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

ACDA-19 DRC-01 /164 W

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R 201620Z DEC 73

FM USMISSION NATO

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INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 6217

(1) REFERENCE IS MADE TO AC/276-D(72)1 ON ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTION TO NATO.

POSSIBLE MEASURES OUTSIDE NATO GUIDELINES AREA

9. TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT VERIFICATION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED TO APPLY OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION IN GENERAL AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FLANKS IN PARTICULAR, WITHOUT DETERMENT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 17 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL).

STAFFING OF INSPECTORATES

10. SUBJECT TO FURTHER ALLIED STUDIES, INSPECTORATES IN THE CENTRAL REGION WOULD BE STAFFED WITH PERSONNEL FROM THOSE NATIONS WITH FORCES OR TERRITORIES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA; FLANK COUNTRIES WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY INSPECTORATES WHICH
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06217 02 OF 04 201912Z

MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION; AND ANY AGREEMENTS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION WOULD CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR THE ASSIGNING OF ALLIED (INCLUDING HOST COUNTRY) LIAISON OFFICERS TO WARSAW PACT INSPECTION TEAMS ON ALLIED TERRITORY, AND VICE VERSA.

ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL

1. NEGOTIATED OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY THE ALLIES SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY NATO. POLICY GUIDANCE SHOULD EMANATE FROM THE COUNCIL AND OVERALL TECHNICAL DIRECTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY A COMPETENT HEADQUARTERS ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL.

12. THE PRODUCT OF NEGOTIATED OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY ALLIED COUNTRIES SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

13. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO VERIFICATION TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS LINKED TO REDUCTION MEASURES ON WHOSE SUBSTANCE THEY MAY HAVE ALREADY AGREED. THEREFORE, THE ACCEPTABILITY OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WOULD BE INCREASED IF THEY WERE PUT FORWARD ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN, IN ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE, THE ALLIES CAN RELATE THEM TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS.

14. INDEPENDENTLY OF THE TABLING OF ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, THE ALLIED SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE AT ALL STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATION THAT THE WEST WANTS OVERT VERIFICATION AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

15. VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS AGREED FOR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS ARE LIKELY TO INFLUENCE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECOND PHASE. SOME VERIFICATION MEASURES (E.G. VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS) WOULD NORMALLY EXTEND INTO AND BEYOND THE SECOND PHASE.

III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06217 02 OF 04 201912Z

VERIFICATION OF PRE-REDUCTION FORCES LEVELS AND/OR PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS

16. PROPOSAL OF THIS MEASURE COULD IMPEDE OVERALL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PREJUDICE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO OTHER MORE ESSENTIAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, HESITANT EVEN TO DISCUSS DATA ON THEIR PRE-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, WILL HARDLY AGREE TO THEIR INSPECTION.

AN ALLIED PROPOSAL TO INSPECT OBSERVANCE OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD FURTHER DIMINISH THEIR NEGOTIABILITY.

VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS

17. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF WITHDRAWALS IS AN IMPORTANT ALLIED OBJECTIVE, AND HIGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ITS SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD INVOLVE THE DEPLOYMENT OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS OBJECTIVE SEEMS TECHNICALLY SOUND AND WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO INVOLVE NATO IN UNACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY.

VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

18. THIS OBJECTIVE IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIES AS VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS. IT COULD INVOLVE THE ASSIGNMENT OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOLLOWING WITHDRAWALS. (THE ASSIGNMENT COULD BE OF INDEFINITE DURATION, BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS). THESE INSPECTORATES WOULD, IN ADDITION TO MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, HAVE ALL OF THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE ACCURACY IN THE VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, PARTICULARLY IN PERSONNEL, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE IN BROAD TERMS.

VERIFICATION OF COLLATERAL STABILISING MEASURES

19. IN NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANCE OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS TO THE POSSIBLE VERIFICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06217 02 OF 04 201912Z

TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT INSPECTION OF WHATEVER STABILISING MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED.

IV. SPECIFIC MEASURES

20. ASSESSMENTS IN THIS SECTION WERE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT ON "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION" MBFR (AC/276-WP(73)43(REVISED) OF 30TH NOVEMBER, 1973. THIS DOCUMENT

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06217 03 OF 04 201932Z

51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

ACDA-19 DRC-01 /164 W

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R 201620Z DEC 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3355

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INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 USNATO 6217

25. THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONCEDE (A) ABOVE IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE FULFILLING THEIR SIDE OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE (B) IS MORE QUESTIONABLE, SINCE THE ABOVE-CITED ADVANTAGES TO THE WEST OF MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS DISADVANTAGES BY THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING BOTH IS NOT EXCLUDED.

26. CONCLUSION: THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE BOTH (A) AND (B) .

B. USE OF MIBILE TEAMS (POSSIBLY SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS) TO MONITOR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

27. THE US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER SUGGESTS A MINIMUM OF 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN EAST GERMANY, 7 TO 8 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, AND 7 TO 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN POLAND. HOWEVER, A NATO STUDY(1) HAS ADVOCATED THE MUCH LARGER TOTAL OF 130 TWO-MAN TEAMS BASED ON 20 DIFFERENT SUB-HEADQUARTERS. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERABLE
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06217 03 OF 04 201932Z

DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THESE TWO SUGGESTIONS FURTHER STUDY IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED. IT WOULD BE IN NATO'S PURELY MILITARY INTEREST TO ACHIEVE A MASIMUM DENSITY OF TEAMS. HOWEVER, CAREFUL CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTION PERSONNEL WHICH COULD BE TOLERATED ON ALLIED TERRITORY FROM A DOMESTIC POLITICAL POINT OF

(1) AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED), PARAGRAPH 27 OF APPENDIX B TO ANNEX.

VIEW, KEEPING IN MIND THE INDEFINITE DURATION, UNDER INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENT, OF THIS VERIFICATION PROVISIONS.

28. DEPENDING ON THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE SUPPLEMENTING THE MOBILE TEAMS WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS. (FOOTNOTE: THESE FIXED POSTS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER, PAGES 45-50.)

29. NONE OF THE ABOVE SYSTEMS (MOBILE TEAMS, STATIC PERIMETER POSTS, CHOKE POINT POSTS) HAS SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES, AND THERE IS NO PREFERENCE FOR ANY ONE OF THEM ON PURELY POLITICAL GROUNDS.

30. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE TO FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS BECAUSE OF THEIR GREATER FLEXIBILITY, EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY; THEY ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO CIRCUMVENT AND REQUIRE FEWER MEN TO STAFF. THEY ALSO HAVE GREATER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING POTENTIAL THAN FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS. MOBILE TEAMS MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE THAN FIXED POSTS, SINCE THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT PERCEIVE OF THE FORMER AS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DECEPTION AND CIRCUMVENTION. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS APPEAR NEGOTIABLE.

31. CONCLUSION: (THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE THE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS AS OUTLINED IN B ABOVE, SUPPLEMENTED BY A SMALL NUMBER OF STATIC TEAMS AT CHOKE POINTS. THE ALLIES SHOULD, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, AVOID NEGOTIATING THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS, SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06217 03 OF 04 201932Z

SINCE THESE FIXED POSTS ARE A VERY POOR SECOND BEST TO MOBILE TEAMS). OR: (THE ALLIES COULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE THE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC TEAMS AT CHOKE POINTS. ALSO, STATIC PERIMETER POSTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.)

C. USE OF MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS (MLMS) TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS IN EAST GERMANY

32. THE US, UK AND FRANCE HAVE MLMS IN EAST GERMANY ACCREDITED TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY. THE MLMS CURRENTLY SERVE AS LIAISON BETWEEN THEIR OWN AND THE SOVIET COMMANDERS IN GERMANY. UNDER PROPOSAL C ABOVE, THE MLMS WOULD BE GIVEN THE ADDITIONAL AND PRIMARY MISSION OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH MBFR AGREEMENTS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. IN THIS CONNECTION, AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE RESTRICTED AREAS IN EAST GERMANY SHOULD BE REMOVED.

33. MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF THIS PROPOSAL: MLMS OVER THE YEARS HAVE DEMONSTRATED A HIGH DEGREE OF PRODUCTIVITY, IMAGINATION, AND OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS IN REPORTING ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON EAST GERMAN TERRITORY. THEY ARE A LARGE (67-MAN), WELL-TRAINED FORCE-IN-BEING WHICH, FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT

OF VIEW, WOULD BE WELL SUITED TO THE TASK OF OVERT INSPECTION IN MBFR. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY DISADVANTAGES TO THEIR USE. HOWEVER, SOME INCREASE IN THEIR STAFFING MIGHT BE REQUIRED, A PRACTICAL PROBLEM WITH POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS (SEE PARAGRAPH 34 BELOW).

34. THERE ARE VERY PRONOUNCED POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES TO THIS PROPOSAL.*THE MLMS WERE ESTABLISHED UNDER POST-WAR AGREEMENT FOR THE VERY LIMITED AND SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF SERVING AS LIAISON BETWEEN THEIR OWN AND THE SOVIET COMMANDERS IN THE SOVIET ZONE OF GERMANY. SWITCHING THEIR PRIMARY MISSION TO MBFR INSPECTION AND INCREASING THEIR SIZE WOULD ALTER THEIR BASIC RAISON D'ETRE AND COULD CREATE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN THE COMPLICATED GERMAN QUESTION. ALSO, THEIR USE IN MBFR INSPECTION MIGHT SIGNIFY A UNIQUE STATUS FOR ALL OF GERMANY IN MBFR AND MARK GERMANY AS A SPECIAL "REDUCTIONS AREA". SINCE ONLY THREE ALLIES HAVE MLMS IN EAST GERMANY, THE REMAINING ALLIES WOULD AB INITIO BE EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN MBFR INSPECTION IN THE GDR. MOREOVER, THE USE OF THE FRENCH MLM FOR MBFR INSPECTION WOULD BE HIGHLY
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06217 03 OF 04 201932Z

QUESTIONABLE, SINCE FRANCE WILL NOT BE A PARTY TO ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. LASTLY, THE RECIPROCAL GRANTING OF AN INSPECTION ROLE TO THE LARGE SOVIET MLMS IN THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ACCEPTABILITY, QUOTE APART FROM THE COMPLEX LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED. IT APPEARS THAT THERE ARE NO POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO THE PROPOSAL.

35. THE NEGOTIABILITY OF THE PROPOSAL IS HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC. ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIETS MIGHT SEE PRACTICAL DISADVANTAGES IN AUGMENTING AND LEGALIZING THE INSPECTION ROLE OF THE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE MLMS IN THIS KEY AREA OF THE CENTRAL REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY MIGHT PERCEIVE OF POLITICAL ADVANTAGES IN ALTERING THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE MLMS, THEREBY BLURRING THEIR ORIGINAL ALL-GERMAN ROLE.

36. CONCLUSION: BECAUSE OF THE OVERRIDING POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES, THIS MEASURE SHOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED.

D. USE OF NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHES TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST REDUCTIONS FORCE LEVELS

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06217 04 OF 04 201943Z

51
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

ACDA-19 DRC-01 /164 W

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R 201620Z DEC 73

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INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 6217

37. IN AN MBFR INSPECTION ROLE, ALLIED NATIONAL ATTACHES OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANT NATIONS IN A GIVEN COUNTRY WOULD WORK AS A TEAM AND WOULD REPORT TO A COMPETENT HEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBLE TO THE NATO COUNCIL.

38. MILITARY ADVANTAGES: ALLIED ATTACHES IN WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES CONSTITUTE A TRAINED FORCE-IN-BEING WHICH, FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, WOULD BE WELL SUITED TO THE TASK OF OVERT INSPECTION IN MBFR. HOWEVER, A MAJOR INCREASE IN STAFFING WOULD BE NECESSARY.

39. POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES: NOT ALL OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANT ALLIES CURRENTLY HAVE ATTACHES IN THE WARSAW PACT PART OF THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA, AND SOME OF THESE ALLIES HAVE ATTACHES IN ONLY ONE COUNTRY. MOREOVER, THERE WOULD BE SOME OBJECTIONS TO ALTERING THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHE. EVEN THE BASIC FORM OF THE ATTACHE SERVICES WOULD BE CHANGED THROUGH THE NECESSARILY LARGE INCREASE IN STAFFING.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06217 04 OF 04 201943Z

40. CONCLUSION: BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES MENTIONED ABOVE, THIS MEASURE SHOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED.

3. "OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL", I.E. THAT MANNED AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS BE USED TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

41. THE SYSTEMS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF SENSORS, MOSTLY PHOTOGRAPHIC. INSPECTORS WOULD FLY ABOARD AIRCRAFT BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE (NORMALLY TO THE INSPECTED COUNTRY), UTILIZE SENSORS PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SIDE, AND BE ACCOMPANIED BY LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY. THE FLIGHTS WOULD ORIGINATE IN THE INSPECTED COUNTRY, ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE FLIGHTS

WOULD BE GIVEN, AND THEY WOULD BE CARRIED OUT ON PRESCRIBED ROUTES AND ALTITUDES. NATO SHOULD AIM FOR MAXIMUM FLIGHT FREEDOM COMPATIBLE WITH MUTUAL POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, FLIGHT SAFETY AND THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

42. THE MAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OVER GROUND OBSERVATION LIES IN ITS ABILITY TO COVER LARGE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS IN SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. A TECHNICAL DRAWBACK IN RELATION TO GROUND OBSERVATION IS THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF AIRBORNE SYSTEMS TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS. IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA BAD WEATHER COULD FREQUENTLY PRECLUDE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY. THIS MEASURE WOULD BE A COMPLEMENT TO GROUND OBSERVATION-NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR IT.

43. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES: THE APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL NATO COUNTRIES IN THIS FORM OF SURVEILLANCE, AS THE LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY IS WITHIN THEIR MEANS. THIS PARTICIPATION WOULD TEND TO FOSTER PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY CONFIDENCE IN THE OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREEMENT. POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES: THE GROUND PERSONNEL AND INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE MIGHT BE EXPENSIVE. ALSO, PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES MIGHT OBJECT TO WARSAW PACT AERIAL INSPECTION OF THEIR TERRITORY ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS TOO ENCOMPASSING AND INTRUSIVE. WHILE GROUND INSPECTORS COULD BE LIMITED LARGELY TO VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH MBFR AGREEMENTS, AERIAL INSPECTORS COULD, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, GLEAN INTELLIGENCE ON A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS OVER VERY LARGE AREAS. APPLICATION OF THIS
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06217 04 OF 04 201943Z

MEASURE OVER ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF LIMITED AS DESCRIBED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THIS SECTION.

44. WARSAW PACT GOVERNMENTS MIGHT HAVE SIMILAR OBJECTIONS TO NATO AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THEIR TERRITORY. BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE CONCERN OF BOTH SIDES ABOUT THE INTRUSIVENESS OF THIS MEASURE, IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE NEGOTIABLE IF PRESENTED IN A CAREFULLY DEFINED FORM WHICH EMPHASISES ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY.

45. CONCLUSION: DEPENDING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER ADVANCING A CAREFULLY DEFINED "OPEN SKIES" PROPOSAL, THE DETAILS OF WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. THE MEASURE WOULD COMPLEMENT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS-NOT SERVE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THEM.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

46. THE ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM TO COVER WITHDRAWALS, "POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, AND, (POSSIBLY,) COLLATERAL STABILISING MEASURES. (IT SHOULD BE A REASONABLY DENSE SYSTEM OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS,

SUPPORTED WHERE APPROPRIATE AND FEASIBLE BY SOME STATIC POSTS
AND SOME MEASURES OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. SPECIFICALLY, OF
THE MEASURES LISTED IN SECTION IV, THE ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE
HARD FOR A AND B AND CONSIDER PROPOSING E.) OR (IT COULD BE A
SYSTEM COMPRISING MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS, STATIS POSTS AND SOME
MEASURES OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. IT SHOULD BE AN OPTIMAL SYSTEM,
THE EXACT DETAILS OF WHICH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE NATURE OF THE
AGREED REDUCTIONS.) SPECIFIC PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD
ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN, IN
ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE, THE ALLIES CAN RELATE THEM TO THE
SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS.

END TEXT

RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 DEC 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: willialc
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO06217
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731255/abqcedzg.tel
Line Count: 610
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 6177
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: willialc
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23-Aug-2001 by elyme>; APPROVED <16-Oct-2001 by willialc>
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To: STATE
SECDEF INFO VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
ALL NATO CAPITALS
MOSCOW
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

